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I offer several remarks on the way I introduce interpretive
methods within a course on research design and intend to
approach a new course devoted to a more systematic exposi-
tion of interpretivism and its methods. Due to space limita-
tions, I signal the key issues that must be addressed and offer
two examples of specific analyses, as the devil tends to be in
details.
Interpretation, an intellectual operation whose essence
has been variously rendered as translation, clarification, or
placing in context, can be usefully introduced to students
with the question, “What needs to be interpreted during the
course of a social scientific inquiry?” In part, the answer to
this question involves recognizing when we are interpreting.
How are the concepts in our studies operationalized? Are
their meanings transparent and universal or do they vary
across cultural contexts? What accounts for the processes
evidenced in formal modeling? To some degree all social sci-
ence analysis, whether aimed at classifying a phenomenon,
imputing a cause, or articulating a process involves interpre-
tation. But in another important sense interpretation is a spe-
cific method of understanding the communicative process
through which discursive objects are created, contested, em-
ployed, and interpreted (by actors) as part of the machinery of
power.
Why Interpret?
While the utility of interpretivist approaches is taken for
granted in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, or femi-
nism, it is far from obvious to many practitioners of political
science. The reasons for this may be complex, but they seem
to be rooted in the predominantly naturalistic tenor of the
discipline (for an alternative perspective see Chabal and Daloz
2006; Smith 2004).1 But if we agree with an (anti-naturalist)
assumption that the signifying process through which people
build models of the world, particularly of the social and politi-
cal world, has political relevance, then the study of how such
models are constructed, transmitted, maintained, and received
becomes of interest to us. The study of such issues is incon-
ceivable without interpretation. Among the phenomena rou-
tinely studied with the help of interpretive approaches are, for
example: (1) legitimacy (as its standards vary from society to
society and depend on contextualized, culture-specific crite-
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cal science class. I wish I could say that students who have
already taken a political theory course seem better prepared
for the class; but that does not seem to be the case. In my
experience, many students regard courses in the history of
political thought as curious addenda to the political science
curriculum that lead few to think about the discipline differ-
ently. By contrast, I’ve had an easier time convincing my stu-
dents in Scope and Methods that what they are learning is
connected to what they have learned in other courses. But
taking the next step—trying to provide my students with a
conceptual vocabulary to use to think about how they have
learned political science—has proven the most difficult. For
instance, although students can readily grasp “positivism”
as a general conception of science, it’s considerably more
difficult for most to explain why a particular piece is or is not
positivist—or to say what sorts of things someone working
within a positivist tradition is likely to overlook or dismiss.
Though I cannot say I have hit upon a good way to do this
yet, I see teaching this class as the best opportunity I have
yet had to weave theoretical thinking into how students un-
derstand political science.
This coming spring, I will be teaching the Logic of Politi-
cal Inquiry, a graduate-level course developed and taught for
many years my colleague, Alan Isaak. Because I believe that
current standards for legitimate political inquiry are the result
of recent disciplinary history, I plan on structuring the course
around a number of intradisciplinary debates over what counts
as sound political science. I intend to tie our discussions of
the philosophy of the social sciences explicitly to that struc-
ture as well.
Teaching such an array of methods courses is unusual
for a political theorist. I have tried to speak from my experi-
ences not only to undo the opposition between theory and
methods but also to show how its reproduction excludes po-
litical theorists from participating in part of what political sci-
ence faculties do to teach their students to think about poli-
tics.
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Table 1: Ontological and Epistemological Dualism
Qualitative & Multi-Method Research, Spring 2009
ria [Aronoff 1991, Kubik 1994]); (2) mechanisms of compli-
ance, quiescence, and everyday resistance (as they involve
the manipulation of cultural understandings of reality
[Wedeen 1999]); and (3) generation, reproduction, and dis-
mantling of collective identities (as such processes involve
the use of “cultural materials” [Ross 2007, Fernandes 2006,
Davis 2005]). Interpretive approaches also provide fresh and
valuable insights into a number of problem areas usually stud-
ied through naturalistic modes of inquiry. Ample evidence of
the fruitfulness of interpretation can be found in the study of
non-Western political systems in comparative politics (Chabal
and Daloz 2006, Ashforth 2005), constructivist work in inter-
national relations (Kratochvil and Ruggie 1986, Klotz and Lynch
2007), “culturalist” analyses in political economy (Blyth 2002),
and even economics (Rao and Walton, eds. 2004).
The first task in introducing interpretation to students,
then, is to get them to recognize that interpretation underlies
the entire enterprise of social science. Whether we are con-
ceptualizing a particular problematic, operationalizing con-
cepts, or organizing observations for analysis, there is a di-
mension of interpretation. I try to demonstrate the reliance of
fundamental concepts of political science analysis on a pro-
cess of signification that is not necessarily transportable from
one social context to another. Cognitive, symbolic, linguistic,
and communicative dimensions of political processes vary
and are clearly influenced by the historical experiences of the
particular society. Recognizing that one is always interpreting
is a critical aspect of acquiring methodological self-aware-
ness. The question then is twofold: how interpretation sup-
ports or relates to other methods and how it is employed in a
rigorous and systematic manner that meets the standards of
scientific analysis we presume are achieved through these
other methods.
Location of Interpretivism among Other Approaches
Interpretivists are beginning to systematize their approach
and engage in an explicit exposition of its assumptions, meth-
ods, and techniques (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, eds. 2006).
Situating interpretivism vis-à-vis the predominant qualitative
and quantitative methodologies illuminates the basic onto-
logical and epistemological assumptions that underpin the
different approaches to knowledge production. Table 1 is a
simple tool I use to discuss the ontological split between
naturalists and anti-naturalists with my students. I begin by
introducing the Geisteswissenschaften versus Naturwissen-
schaften distinction of Droysen and Dilthey and then ask
them to reflect on the proposition that anti-naturalism is asso-
ciated with a specific ontology of the social and therefore
calls for at least partial reliance on a specific method: interpre-
tation or understanding. The debate on the “proper” match
between methods and problems (Bevir and Kedar 2008) is a
fruitful point of departure for considering both the informa-
tion necessary to answer certain questions and the poten-
tially complementary relationship between different modes of
inquiry. For example, interpretivism can enhance survey work
(Stoker 2003: 13–16) or game theory (O’Neil 1999, Bates et al.
1998, Johnson 2002).
Interpretation of What?
Three Basic Varieties of the Operation
There are at least three dimensions of political science
research that engage interpretive skills, whether consciously
or not. The first is in recognizing and classifying observations
(or “data”). For example, is a group of people gathered in a
market square a religious procession, a political rally, or a crowd
getting ready for an open-air concert? Does the uniform of a
person whose actions we are studying signify a soldier or a
miner? Interpretive skills enable basic coding and classifica-
tion. Without them, much comparative work is inconceivable.
Weber calls this type of interpretive work direct observational
understanding. I refer to it as classificatory interpretation.
The second interpretive moment comes when we try to specify
what drives human agency: “Why does/did she do this?” When
researchers ascribe motives (psychological approaches) or
reasons (rational choice approaches) to human behavior, they
engage in what Weber refers to as explanatory understanding.
I call it motivational interpretation. The third is in reconstruct-
ing the meaning of actions, statements, displays, performances,
etc. Discerning “What does she mean by this?” or “What is
the meaning of this action?” involves semiotic/communica-
tive interpretation.
Ontology
Unity of Object Different Object
(Naturalism) (Anti-Naturalism)
                  Unity of Method Positivism Ontological
Dualism/Epistemological
Monism
                  Different Methods               ?        Interpretivism
Epistemology
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Combining Motivational and Semiotic Interpretation
and Causal Explanation
Systematic methodological reflection about the relation-
ship between causal explanation and interpretation (under-
standing) began with Weber. My course thus takes Weber’s
methodology, including his own writings and several critical
commentaries on his seminal studies, as the point of depar-
ture. In addition, I present a sequence of slides designed to
elucidate the difference between motivational and semiotic
modes of interpretation, and to locate the latter within the
explanatory sequence. I rely on an example offered by Martin
(2000).
Simple Causal Relationship
          If A, then B.
A – “Being the inhabitant of a city that is devastated by bombs”
B – “The lack of resistance to aggression”
Source: Martin (2000)
We begin with a simple model of a causal relationship.
The first step in analysis is to formulate a proposition that
captures the nature of the relationship between two social-
level phenomena. Such a proposition can be expressed thus:
“If a city is bombed, its inhabitants will not resist further
aggression.”2 Explanation generally involves more than a
simple statement of cause and effect, however. The link be-
tween them must be articulated by demonstrating why or how
a presumed cause produces a presumed effect. In an influen-
tial admonition to specify the underlying mechanisms in causal
explanations—effectively linking “macro” to “micro” expla-
nations—Coleman (1990) proposed what has come to be
known as the “Coleman boat” (Coleman-Lindberg diagram).
This model, illustrated below, inserts between two “macro”
phenomena and at least one “micro” mechanism.
From Macro to Micro: Coleman’s “Boat”
    A1                       B1
 A      ---------------------       B
 ?
A – macro causes A1 – micro causes
B – macro causes B1 – micro causes
Micro causes and micro effects are states or attributes of
individual people. How do we know whether A1 “causes” B1?
How do we get into “their heads”? What method or research
procedure do we need to discern why people act as they do?
One answer may come from empathy, understood roughly as a
combination of introspection and reasoning through analogy
(what transpires in my psyche can be attributed to other hu-
man beings).3 The next image demonstrates location of empa-
thy in the construction of motivational explanations.
(1) Weber’s Explanatory Verstehen
(According to Martin 2000: 18–25)
Empathy generates a bridging proposition that states, for
example: “If an individual feels terror and dread, as a result
(s)he also develops a feeling of helplessness.” Then, a testable
set of propositions can take us from the “experience of being
bombed” to the “feeling of terror and dread” connected through
empathy to the “feeling of helplessness” experienced individu-
ally, and finally to the “lack of resistance” by the whole/major-
ity of/a part of the population. The bridge between A1 and B1
can be built in many ways, without empathy, but with the use
of psychological theories about motivation. I do not develop
this here for lack of space.
We can also model the argument in game theoretic terms.
For example, statements about “feelings” can be replaced with
statements about “strategic calculations,” including a recon-
struction of an individual preference ordering and assessing
the viability of various courses of action (given the assumed or
observed actions of others).
A well-known benefit of game theoretic analysis is that it
helps to analyze the collective action dilemma and investigate
under what conditions rationally calculating individuals en-
gage or do not engage in (collective) action given what they
know about the actions of others. A researcher may identify
“tipping points,” “cascading effects,” etc. Interpretation is
nonetheless a critical component of linking individual agency
to observed collective behavior by attributing “reasons” (rather
than “motivations) to individuals. In this task we may rely on
“empathy,” but usually we employ a deductively constructed
model of a “calculating, rational individual.” One way or an-
other, however, we begin our analysis by interpreting the mo-
tives or reasons “causing” individual (in)action.
Empathy ? Verstehen?
A1 – “Feeling of terror and dread”
B1 – “Feeling of helplessness”
        A       ---------------------       B
 A      ---------------------        B
 A1              B1
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Reconstruction of strategic decision making
A1 – Evaluating various preferences for courses of
action (represented by a utility function)
B1 – Responding strategically (rationally) to actions
of others
Now, let’s imagine a modified situation. After a bombing
that most likely contributes to the lowering of the “fighting
spirit” of the population, a popular leader goes public (in all/
some available media) with a story that recounts the city’s
heroic past. She or he reminds people that once before their
ancestors successfully mobilized after an initial defeat, asks
them to overcome their fears and despondency, and appeals to
them for a common action against the enemy. In short, the
leader offers a narrative of empowerment. People listen; some
of them redefine their situation and begin to see it in a more
positive light. They convince themselves that success is pos-
sible or that they want to defend their city even if the chances
of success are miniscule. Mobilization for defense can be quite
effective among this section of the population.
(3) Intepretive Turn
Once a narrative of empowerment begins to circulate
among the members of the group, it influences their con-
ceptualizations of the situation and as a result it may change
their motivations (or calculations). The story is a crucial ele-
ment of the analyzed situation. Many researchers will con-
clude that an account of what happened that does not include
an interpretation of the narrative of empowerment and an analy-
sis of its effectiveness is incomplete. They will want to know
the details of the story, its origins, and how it fits within the
broader context of the group’s culture. Often they will want to
know more: who told the story, through what channel(s) of
communication (and if there were several, which was most
effective and why?), from what position (was this person pow-
erful?), to whom, and with what effect (were there groups in
the population who responded more readily to the appeal than
others and why?)? As the next image suggests, interpretively
oriented researchers want to study the semiotic practices that
shape individual motivation and rational calculation rather than
the message alone (Wedeen 2004).
(4) Intepretation “In Context” (of Power and Institutions)
The insertion of analyses of semiotic practices into studies of
international conflicts, electoral campaigns, or strategies of
political resistance is increasingly common; it is particularly
intriguing in the work of developmental economists (Rao and
Walton, eds. 2004).
Interpretation and the Study of Semiotic Practices
The study of semiotic practices can be designed in many
ways. For example, it can be fashioned as a reconstruction of
an event in terms of a Turnerian4 social drama (Wagner-Pacifici
1986), an ethnographic case study (Geertz 1973), ethnographi-
cally grounded sociology (Wedeen 1999), policy analysis
(Yanow 1997), or game theoretic modeling (O’Neill 1999). It can
be grounded in the vocabulary and models proposed by po-
litical economists or “pure” institutionalists. All of these ap-
proaches, however, involve an interpretive component.
There are many ways to begin studying semiotic/com-
municative interpretation and its components. Umberto Eco
breaks down the process into three tasks. First, we may want
to identify the intended meaning of the message (text, dis-
course, poster, painting, speech, performance, etc.). Intentio
auctoris—as Eco calls it—is not always available and usu-
ally difficult to reconstruct. Nonetheless, a skillful interviewer
or diligent biographer may shed a light on this component of
cultural creation. Second, we need to analyze the meaning(s)
of the message, intentio operis. This is the proper subject of
semiotic analysis and structural work. Methods of reconstruct-
ing syntagmatic chains (how to build “sentences” of culture?),
paradigmatic sets (what are building blocs of cultural forms
appropriate for a specific task?), and pragmatic strategies (what
is more likely to “work” in a given population?) are described
in countless manuals, including works on content and dis-
course analysis (for a useful introduction of some key issues,
Intepretation
 A1 – “Feeling of terror and dread”  ~B1 – Feeling of power
 N – Narrative of empowerment       ~B – Resistance to
              aggression
(2) Rational Calculation
 A      ---------------------       B
 A1              B1
 A       -----------------------------       ~B





 A       -----------------------------       ~B
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see Herrera and Braumoeller 2004). Third, the study of recep-
tion, the interpretation of the message by the (intended or
unintended) audience, is a critical aspect of understanding
public communication. Reception can vary substantially within
a given group and in many cases reflects an active process of
resistance through deliberate re-characterization of the mes-
sage. Intentio lectoris can be studied through in-depth inter-
viewing, participant observation, and surveys. This last tool is
routinely used in the approach called political culture. It is
important to remember that the study of attitudes, orienta-
tions, and perceptions contributes to the reconstruction of
only one dimension of the cultural process. A complete analy-
sis of this process must include two other elements: the recon-
struction of the authors’ intentions (particularly intended mean-
ings) and the study of the message itself.
If we agree that the study of politics should encompass
the analysis of the communicative (cultural) process through
which some actors propose certain world-views, encode them
in symbolic vehicles, and try to disseminate them, while others
encode and interpret these messages and accept, reject, or
simply register their “meaning,” then the study of the “sym-
bolic content” of the messages is unavoidable.5 Only if we
understand the message and its place in a broader cultural
context can we deduce its political significance. Each cultural
product is formed by its author, who selects from a rich albeit
not infinite repertoire of available cultural materials. If we want
to understand the strategy (politics) behind such choices we
need to be able to contrast choices that are actually made with
the options that are (deliberately or not) forgone. That is why
interpretation needs to go beyond merely determining if a cul-
tural message does or does not have a causal effect (King,
Keohane and Verba 1994: 36–41). In most cases, we want to
know how a semiotic practice works and why it is (in)effective.
One of the untapped (by political scientists) reservoirs of
high-quality interpretive work is the Russian (and Soviet)
school of semiotics. Its authors have long recognized that
cultural mechanisms—together constituting a huge coordi-
nating system—need to be carefully studied in order to im-
prove our understanding of politics and, in particular, the
machinery of power. A study of how Peter the Great built
legitimacy for his power, by Boris Uspienskij, is exemplary of
carefully crafted interpretive work. In the following passage
drawn from Uspienskij’s analysis, italicized and boldfaced
words or phrases signal critical stages in the interpretive pro-
cess, which are briefly discussed below:
In 1721, Peter assumed a new title: he began to be offi-
cially called “Emperor,” “the Great,” and in addition, “fa-
ther of the fatherland.”… This expression is nothing other
than a translation of the Latin pater patriae, an honor-
ary title of the Roman emperors. However, it had a differ-
ent ring in a Russian cultural context. Since paternity in
general can be either blood or spiritual kinship, and Peter
obviously could not be the people’s father in the sense
of blood kinship, this name was understood to be a pre-
tension to spiritual kinship. But only a member of the
church hierarchy could be a spiritual father, and in turn,
the title “father of the fatherland” could only be applied
to an archpastor-bishop and primarily to the patriarch…
therefore the designation in question could be inter-
preted as meaning that Peter was head of the church and
proclaimed himself a patriarch. And that is precisely how
it was interpreted. (Uspenskij 1977:109)
First, by using the word “assumed,” Uspienskij signals that
he practices a post-structuralist style of analysis. It calls for
the identification of agency and its actions and is founded on
an assumption that cultural change is not a matter of apersonal
transformations, as it was usually modeled in structural analy-
ses, but, rather, is caused by deliberate actions of specific
actors. Second, the word “translation” identifies a specific
semiotic operation. Uspienskij identifies the source of the
“translated” cultural idea: the classical Rome. Third, the con-
text (“Russian”) into which the translated element is inserted
is identified and its transformative capacity is emphasized.
Fourth, the mechanism of (potential) semiotic transformation
is actually (albeit briefly) described. The analyst, in this case
an “expert” on the Russian culture, identifies the field of po-
tential meanings of the new element and points to the mean-
ing that is privileged by the logic of culture. I believe that the
interpretive (or semiotic) analysis is seriously flawed if such
logic is not reconstructed independently from the reconstruc-
tion of actors’ actual (interpretive or otherwise) choices and
actions. Fifth, Uspienskij informs the reader how the new cul-
tural idea (Peter as pater patriae) actually began to function:
the popular interpretation followed the path privileged by the
cultural logic predominant at that time in Russia. He does not
tell us how he knows this (his historical studies?), but we can
easily imagine the utility of modern survey instruments in
arriving at such a conclusion.
Misconceptions and Myths: Interpretation Clarified
The perception of interpretive methods in political sci-
ence is fraught with misconceptions. Some are based on the
lack of knowledge or erroneous understanding of what “inter-
preters” do. Some have deeper philosophical roots and are
related to misplaced specifications of differences among vari-
ous epistemological positions (see Bevir and Kedar 2008 for
some important comments on this issue). For lack of space, I
will only signal several problems belonging to the first group.
First, it is sometimes asserted that interpretive methods
are non-empirical (Ragin 1987: 3, 35). The validity of this argu-
ment rests, of course, on the definition of empiricism. Without
entering a complex philosophical debate, it may be advisable
to offer students some readings from art history and discuss
with them the meaning of “empiricism” in concrete interpre-
tive studies. I often recommend studying Ervin Panofsky’s
method of iconological analysis (1972) and it application in a
short work on Gothic architecture and scholasticism (1951).
Second, interpretation is sometimes presented as an intel-
lectual operation based only on empathy or introspection. It is
not difficult to show that this is simply not true. Dilthey, one of
the founding figures in the history of hermeneutics, moved
ahead from “psychological” introspection to intersubjectively
16
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verifiable reconstruction of cultural meanings. My favorite
method of dispelling this misconception is to have students
re-read Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-
talism. I ask them to find examples of “empathy.” None is to be
found. Weber works like a semiotician employing a form of
content analysis (admittedly rudimentary by today’s stan-
dards). He reconstructs and interprets the meanings of, say,
Franklin’s sayings. His interpretations are contestable and fal-
sifiable.
Third, critics claim that interpretation is imprecise, impres-
sionistic, undisciplined, and arbitrary. It is, however, easy to
demonstrate that in specific areas of interpretive scholarship
there exist specifiable rules, accumulation of knowledge, meth-
ods of achieving (and challenging) consensus, and inter-sub-
jective checks and balances. A useful way of introducing these
issues is to study the debate initiated by Geertz’s celebrated
interpretive essay on the Balinese cockfight, not merely the
essay itself (Jones 1998, Martin 1993, Segal 1999). Eco (1992)
offers another useful primer. In his exchange with Rorty on the
limits of interpretation, he warns against overinterpretation,
shows how we may try to avoid it, introduces a useful distinc-
tion between interpretation and use, and demonstrates that
the former is not completely arbitrary.
Fourth, semiotic interpretation is often seen as an induc-
tive mode of inquiry. Here, three arguments are worth fielding.
First, students may be asked to examine semiotic or hermeneu-
tic studies that focus on the way standardized and prescribed
methods of meaning encoding are realized in practice. An ex-
ample may be the study of the way various artists employ
prescriptions codified in manuals of allegorical and symbolic
representations (see Ripa 1971). Similar “manuals,” though
usually rather less explicit and precise, exist in other areas, for
example in the field of political advertising. The method em-
ployed in the examination of the “fit” between a manual’s in-
structions and specific realizations is at least partially deduc-
tive. Second, much interpretive work is founded on the falsifi-
cationist logic of conjectures and refutations a la Popper rather
than induction. Third, it can be argued that the logic of inter-
pretation is neither deductive nor inductive. It is abductive in
the Piercean sense. In turn, reflection on the logic of abduc-
tion, understudied by comparison with deduction and induc-
tion, helps to grasp the benefits and pitfalls of the critical
Popperian distinction between the context of discovery and
the context of justification, and inject some rigor into thinking
about the former.6
Fifth, given the difficulty of separating the context of jus-
tification from the context of discovery in interpretation (its
abductive character), another criticism, that interpretation is
good only for hypothesis generation and not for verification
or falsification, is misdirected.
Sixth, it is sometimes argued that interpretivists see inter-
pretation as the only goal of social science. Geertz’s famous
words that the analysis of culture is “not an experimental sci-
ence in search of law but an interpretive one in search of mean-
ing” (1973: 5) are often quoted in support of this view. Geertz’s
views evolved and grew more complex in his several decades
of work following that statement (see, for example, 1983; 2003:
27). But more importantly, many intepretivists do pursue causal
explanations and see interpretation as one research procedure
among many.
Seventh, interpretation is said to be unscientific. How-
ever, interpretation is arguably no less “scientific” than causal
inference. The relative status of either task depends on the
definition of science. For King, Keohane and Verba (1994),
“good research, that is, scientific research” (7) has four char-
acteristics:
(1) The goal is inference. There are two types of infer-
ence: descriptive and causal. Descriptive inference in-
volves “using observations from the world to learn about
unobserved facts.” Causal inference involves “learning
about causal effects from the data observed” (8)
(2) The procedures are public
(3) The conclusions are uncertain
(4) The content is method
Interpretation meets all four criteria: (1) it relies on inference to
connect observed phenomena (signifying elements) with the
(unobserved) meanings (signified elements); (2) its procedures
are (or at least are supposed to be) public and repeatable; (3)
its result are provisional (uncertain) and always subject to
verification and updating; and (4) its content can be con-
strued as method.
The task, whose realization has already begun, is to sys-
tematically demonstrate the validity of these points as well as
specify and examine the method’s:
(1) ontological affiliations (How are society and politics
understood and defined?);
(2) epistemological commitments (How are societies and
politics defined in a specific manner knowable?);
(3) rules and procedures;
(4) disciplinary varieties (semiotics, hermeneutics); and
(5) specific techniques (for example, content analysis,
[critical] discourse analysis, ethnographic accounts of
meaning-formation through rituals, etc.).
Notes
1 These remarks are mostly based on and related to the field of
comparative politics, my area of academic specialization. Amy Linch’s
assistance in sharpening my argument was invaluable. I also thank
my colleagues and students at Rutgers, who provided many critical
remarks while listening to my early efforts to develop this essay.
2 There are, of course, many ways to finesse this proposition,
express it in probabilistic terms, offer clearer conceptualizations of
the key concepts, etc.
3 It is easy to trivialize the role of empathy in Dilthey’s or Weber’s
methodologies. Martin (2000) provides a very useful discussion of
how empathy relates to other components of the understanding
(Verstehen) method.
4 Victor Turner’s approach and methods are clearly presented in
Turner (1974).
5 “The struggle over world views should itself be treated as a
strategic process” (Bates et al. 1998: 633–635).
6 For a useful, brief introduction to these issues, see Uve Wirth
(http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/inferenc.htm), who observes:
“The Peircean account of abductive inference denies the possibil-
17
ity to draw a sharp borderline between ‘context of discovery’ and
‘context of justification.’”
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